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Empirical analyses on the determinants of life satisfaction often include the impact of the number of 
children variable among controls without fully discriminating between its two (socio-relational and 
pecuniary) components. In our empirical analysis on the German Socioeconomic Panel we show 
that, when introducing household income without correction for the number of members, the 
pecuniary effect prevails and the sign is negative while, when we equivalise income with the most 
commonly adopted equivalence scales, the non pecuniary (socio-relational) effect emerges and the 
impact of the variable is positive and significant above a minimal scale elasticity threshold. We 
further reject slope homogeneity and show that the positive relational effect is stronger for males, 
below median income households and East Germans. We interpret these subsample split results as 
driven by heterogeneous opportunity costs.  
Our empirical results give rise to a paradox: why people have children if the overall (pecuniary plus 
relational) effect on life satisfaction is negative? We provide in the paper some interpretations 
consistent with our findings. Some of them are based on motivational complexity. This implies that 
demographic policies and the paradox are strictly connected. Effectiveness of tax/subsidies 
impacting on fertility crucially depends on whether the children paradox may be solved within the 
self-interested rationality paradigm. 
 
Keywords: equivalised income, scale elasticities, life satisfaction 




A large number of empirical papers investigating the determinants of life satisfaction include the 
number of children as a control variable together with (non equivalised) household income. In 
many cases the variable is not significant
1 whereas, in others, negative and significant
2. These 
findings lead Blanchflower (2008) to declare in a recent survey that individuals without children are 
happier than those having it. To shed more light on this controversial issue consider that with this 
standard specification we calculate a total effect which can be usefully decomposed into a 
                                                 
1 See results of Haller and Hadler (2006) in the WVS and those of Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003) in a 
1992-1997 GSOEP estimate on West and East German workers. 
2 See, among others, Frey and Stutzer (2000),  Alesina et al. (2004), Di Tella et al. (2003) and Smith (2003). The last 
two papers also observe that children have stronger negative effect in UK and the US than in Europe or Russia.   2
pecuniary (children reduce the portion of income available to each family member) and a non 
pecuniary effect which includes a relational component (people have children because they enjoy 
the relational value of having them) and other likely factors among which the parents’ desire to 
“leave their trace” beyond the current generation and to have support when they are older. 
It is surprising to observe that the empirical literature, while elaborating different 
approaches to equivalise income and account for the effect of children as control factor, has never 
focused so far in depth on this specific issue. Our goal is to provide a contribution in this direction 
since disentangling the two (economic and relational) effects may have a series of interesting 
implications.  
First, the decomposition between the economic and relational benefit/loss of having children 
may be important in cost-benefit analyses of welfare policies. The gross (non decomposed) effect 
(if negative) allows to calculate the monetary incentive which can, on average, trigger the decision 
to have children. The net non economic effect (if positive) may help to calculate the social benefit 
of the decision triggered by such monetary incentive and therefore be a substantial tool in analyses 
on how to use public money and, in particular, how much of it dedicate to support (discourage) 
fertility. The measurement of this social benefit will be proposed in section 7 of the paper using the 
compensating surplus approach.  
Second, the proposed decomposition may help to calculate the upper bound of the cost of 
loosing part of the relational life with children for one of the two members of a divorced couple. 
Assume, as it often occurs, that the child is assigned to only one of the parents while the other 
partner leaving the household has to pay the alimonies (or his/her part of the economic cost of the 
child) to the parent who is in charge. What is generally not considered is that the former looses part 
of the relational benefit of living with the children. In other terms, alimonies are calculated on the 
basis of the economic effect of rearing children but do not include the partial loss of the positive 
relational effect which could be in principle detracted from them (at least when the money is not 
essential for the economic self-sufficiency of the parent who is in charge of the child). It may   3
therefore be useful to calculate the shadow value of such lost benefit using life satisfaction 
estimates.  
Third, the same non economic effects may help to evaluate the social benefit of laws which 
make it easier to adopt children. In such case, in presence of a willingness to adopt by a couple, the 
creation of an opportunity to do it will produce both the economic and the non economic effects. 
Finally, the evaluation of the relational value of children is important in the quantification of 
non economic compensation rules in case of death accidents involving them. Consider however 
that, in this case, the relational value of the child, calculated as the difference in life satisfaction 
between those having and those not having them, is likely to be a lower bound of the cost of losing 
a child. The latter should entails much more since it includes the cost of an irrecoverable separation 
from a beloved family member. 
Note that, in order to fully evaluate the effectiveness of decomposition driven policies, we 
need to provide an explanation for the children paradox: why people have children if the latter have 
on aggregate negative effects on their life satisfaction? More specifically, tax/subsidies may be fully 
effective only if the paradox can be solved within the self-interested rationality paradigm. This is 
because individuals will react to pecuniary incentives only if their fertility decisions are determined 
by self-interest. When interpreting the paradox we will however show that, among potential 
explanations, only some of them may be reconciled with it.  
Based on the above mentioned considerations we propose in this paper different ways of 
decomposing the economic and relational effects of having children. To do so we use the most 
commonly adopted types of equivalence scales
3 and we follow two different (revealed preferences 
and stated level of utility) approaches. The first (normative or demand based) approach is 
commonly used in income inequality analyses and makes use of so-called expert scales, where 
given weights are assigned to different household members. The second (stated level of utility) 
                                                 
3 In general, equivalence scales are intended to measure the variation in income needed to bring households of different 
compositions to the same welfare level. The main arguments revolve around economies of scale in household formation 
and increasing utility when households choose to have children.   4
approach is more coherent with our well being analysis because it attempts to estimate the 
equivalent household income by using the income satisfaction information  available in the panel. 
In this case respondents are requested to evaluate their current income and quantify their derived 
utility. Hence, the equivalent household income derived via this method should correct for the size 
of the family as well.  
With this methodological approach we look at the problem from different angles. We 
measure the marginal effect of having an additional child showing that such effect gets more 
positive when we move from non equivalised to equivalised household income with growing scale 
elasticities. We finally calculate, on the basis of estimated parameters, the compensating surplus for 
an additional child, its actual economic cost and the economic value of its relational (non economic 
effect).  
The paper is divided into eight sections (including introduction and conclusions). The 
second section briefly sketches the questions implicitly posed by the life satisfaction literature on 
the effect of children on life satisfaction. The third section presents our database, descriptive 
findings and the econometric specification to be estimated. The fourth section discusses 
econometric findings when equivalised income is calculated under the two different (revealed 
preferences and stated level of utility) approaches. The fifth section documents the slope 
heterogeneity of the children effect under three (gender, income and geographical) sample splits. 
The sixth section looks at the economic significance of our results by calculating compensating 
surplus and other measures for a quantitative evaluation of the economic and non economic costs of 
having children. The seventh section discusses results from some robustness checks of our findings. 
Section eight concludes.  
   5
2. Review of the literature 
 
Findings from different papers focusing on other variables and using the number of children as 
control provide important pieces to recompose the puzzle of the effect of children on life 
satisfaction, even though no specific contribution puts them together.  
A first element of the puzzle tells us that, when using a measure of non equivalised 
household income as regressor in life satisfaction estimates, the number of children has often 
negative or insignificant effects (see footnotes 1 and 2 in the previous section). Dolan et al. (2008) 
in their recent happiness survey remember that the negative effect is stronger when economic and 
relational conditions are harsher such as in cases of single parents (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Angeles, 
2009), divorced mothers (Schoon et al., 2005), poor families (Alesina et al., 2004 for the US), 
children over 3 years (e.g. Shields and Price, 2005) or who are sick and require extra care (Marks et 
al., 2002). 
The negative effect is confirmed when moving from the more long term oriented evaluation 
of life satisfaction to the measurement of momentary affects, with Kahneman et al. (2004) showing 
that taking care of children is among the less satisfaction-enhancing activities in his daily 
reconstruction method.  
By contrast, Easterlin (2005) documents that the desire of children is strong and does not 
change much around life cycle (the share of people who want one child or more is around 70 
percent and the average desired number of children is around 2). The author also concludes that, in 
case of children, aspirations do not adjust to the level of achievement as it is usually the case for 
material ends.  
Since it is difficult to believe that the large majority of births are undesired, the puzzle is 
therefore why people desire (or do not prevent) something that is going to have negative effects on 
their life satisfaction. In order to solve it we identify five possible explanations related to the share   6
of non married couples, the life cycle effects of children on happiness and the role of non self-
interested motivations of human action. 
A first easy answer is that the negative effect disappears once we rule out from the sample 
non married couples. Single and separated mothers may have decided to have children because they 
were living or hoped to live in the future a stable love relationship while unfortunately they do not. 
The (life cycle related) second answer can be understood considering that first child births 
have a positive effect around the event date which however vanishes after the first year (Clark et al., 
2008). Consider however that Stanca (2009) shows in a broader time horizon, from a cross-
sectional estimate on a large number of countries, that the effect of children is positive and 
significant in samples of individuals above a given age threshold. Putting these pieces of evidence 
together we may argue that having children generates a positive effect around the event date which 
vanishes soon after it. Raising children is tough but individuals still decide to have them because 
they anticipate that they will highly value their offspring when they will be older. Still, this 
interpretation is not consistent with the observed negative effect if we assume a fully rational and 
forward looking evaluation of life satisfaction (if the discounted positive future effect when old is 
higher than the negative short term effect of rearing children, the effect on life satisfaction should 
be positive). The only possibility is that people overweight current and past circumstances when 
declaring their life satisfaction levels instead of (implicitly or explicitly) considering a “permanent 
(forward looking) life satisfaction” approach when taking decisions affecting their future lives.  
A third explanation which also departs from the full rationality assumption is that 
individuals mainly look at the relational effect of having children and underestimate the economic 
effect on their income. This explanation may stand if the effect of children is significant and 
positive when singled out from the induced economic reduction of available household income per 
member. 
Another way to solve the paradox is looking at motivational complexity. If we take the Sen 
(1979) point when he argues that individuals are not just moved by self-interest, but also by   7
sympathy and commitment, we might argue that the decision to have children falls into those duties 
which most people feel they have to comply with. In more recent times, a wide range of 
experimental and revealed preference results demonstrated that individual choices are not just 
driven by self-interest but also by motivations such as (full or partial) reciprocity, inequity aversion, 
strategic altruism and commitment.
 4  
If we take into account the broader framework of motivational complexity we may argue that 
having children is lived as a commitment even though individuals are perfectly aware that this is 
not going to increase their life satisfaction.  Fifth and final, children may be a problem of lack of 
self control but we find difficult to believe that fertility may be explained only by it. 
When we discern among different explanations, an important question is whether we can 
solve the puzzle without abandoning rationality (as we do in explanations two, three and five) or 
purely self-interested preferences (as we do in explanation four). In this direction consider that, 
when using the number-of-children  variable, we are measuring the marginal effect of an additional 
children assuming that such effect is equal whatever the starting number of children (from the first 
to the second or from the third to the fourth). This is somewhat different and stronger than 
estimating the value of having vis-à-vis not having children. In other terms, the value of having 
children is underestimated when modelling a constant linear effect of the number of children 
variable, if we believe that a new birth when the number of children is already large does not have 
the same positive effect than the birth of the first child. We will provide a robustness check in our 
paper to see if our results are sensitive to this problem. 
For a deeper look at the above mentioned issues raised in the literature it is therefore useful 
to start from the point that the overall impact of children (captured with the traditional approach of 
using household income and the number of children) may be decomposed into a relational effect 
(presumably positive) and an economic effect by which income in the household is reduced when 
the number of members gets higher.  
                                                 
4 In the vast literature on non purely self-interested preferences see, among others, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Charness and Rabin (2002).   8
This decomposition does not imply that the overall children effect is not negative but may be useful 
to calculate, for instance, the subsidy or tax allowance which could tilt the balance in favour of the 
relational effect. Such evaluation may be an important tool for policies which aim at having impact 
on fertility rates in a European framework in which most countries are below the replacement rate 
and find increasing problems in financing the pension system. Finally, an interpretation of the 
children/happiness paradox may help us to understand the degree of effectiveness of the above 
described demographic policies.   
Based on these considerations, in the empirical section which follows we: i) decompose the 
relational and economic effects of having children; ii) verify the differences in gross and 
decomposed effects when looking at the marginal effect of having an additional children and the 
difference between having and non having them; iii) explore in sample splits the different impact of 
the relational and economic effects on income, geographic and gender splits; iv) calculate the 
compensating surplus of the children effect v) draw some conclusions on possible explanations of 
the puzzle. 
 
3. The database, descriptive findings and the model  
We select a subsample of individuals, aged from 18 years onwards, surveyed in the GSOEP
5 dataset 
during the period 1984 to 2007. Our unbalanced sample contains around 214,565 person–year 
observations with West-Germans accounting for 150,678 and East-Germans, who joined the survey 
from 1990, for the remaining 63,887 observations
6.  
Our dependent variable is subjective life satisfaction. The information comes from the 
response to the question “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered”? The 
responses are rated from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). In our sample, the 
                                                 
5 Data used in this paper were extracted with the Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata®. PanelWhiz   
 (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and 
Hahn (2006) for details. The PanelWhiz generated DO file used to retrieve the data is available upon request.  
6 For Sample C (East Germans), the first wave of data was gathered in 1990, (wave G in terms of the West German 
sample).   9
question is approximately recorded for 18,794 individuals (for a total of 202,200 person–year 
observations). The total number of observations is 103,436 for males and 111,129 for females.  
Individuals with children account for 35.03 percent of the sample. Among them, 54.08 
percent have 1 child (40,646 observations), 35.6 percent have two children, 8.22 percent three 
children and the remaining 2.1 percent from four to six children. During the survey period, the birth 
of a child occurred 5,658 times involving 3,762 persons (1,871 men and 1,891women).
7  
In Figures 1, 2 and 3 we sketch the distribution of declared life satisfaction comparing 
people with no children to people having one, two and three children (not considering the few 
individuals having more than 3 children). We observe that respective life satisfaction distributions 
are very similar. However, on average, people having children seem slightly happier than those not 
having them: the average life satisfaction of the latter is 6.88 versus 6.93 for those having a child 
and 6.97 for those having two children. If we consider separately men and women, women with no 
children declare on average a satisfaction of 6.87, a value slightly lower than that of those having 
one child (6.91) and those with two children (6.97). The same ranking is observed among men 
where those with no children declare an average level of life satisfaction of 6.88 vis-à-vis slightly 
higher levels of those who have one child (6.95) and those with two children (6.97).  
These descriptive findings cannot disentangle the impact of fixed effects (time invariant 
characteristics) from the children effect on life satisfaction: people with more children are slightly 
happier because of the children or, quite to the contrary, individuals with happier characters are 
likely to have more children? And is the children effect significant after controlling for other 
concurring factors?  
  To answer these questions we adopt the following standard panel fixed effect
8 life 
satisfaction estimate as a benchmark model  
                                                 
7 Summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are provided in table A1 in the Appendix.  
8 As it is well known fixed effects may eliminate the problem of reverse causality and endogeneity with regard to time 
invariant characteristics which are suspect to affect both the number of children and life satisfaction. However, they 
cannot eliminate the problem for time varying omitted factors.    10
,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , , ln( ) it it it it j j it k k it i it
jk
LS HY NChildren NnonChildren X X α αα α αα η ε =+ + + + + Δ + + ∑ ∑        (1) 
where the first three regressors of our specific interest are the log of the real after tax household 
income (HY), the number of child (NChildren) and non child (NnonChildren) household members. 
These variables are drawn from the Cross-National Equivalent File 1980-2007
9. More specifically, 
the household income is the sum of total family income from labour earnings, asset flows, private 
retirement income, private transfers, public transfers, and social security pensions minus total 
family taxes
10. The number of children indicates the number of individuals in the household under 
age of 18, while the number of adults is the number of individuals minus the number of persons 
under age of 18 in the household at the time of the interview. Among the X-controls which follow 
in the specification we include, as usual, marital status, employment status, age dummies, years of 
education, house property as a proxy of wealth, number of days in hospital as a proxy of health 
status, regional and time dummies. ΔX-controls relate to changes in marital status and employment 
status (see Appendix, Table A4 for details). 
The life satisfaction variable is reported in an ordinal scale, so that an ordered probit or logit 
regression model is usually estimated. Consider, however, that  Van Praag and Ferrer–i–Carbonell 
(2004 and 2006) show that the simple linear models are as good as the Probit and Logit method
11, 
but computationally much easier. Moreover, the linear model allows us to control for time invariant 
idiosyncratic effects and may therefore fully exploit the potential information available in our panel 
data.
12  
                                                 
9 The Cross-National Equivalent File is created by Cornell University, in close cooperation with DIW-Berlin, ISER 
Essex and StatsCan-Ottawa, consisting of variables from the German SOEP, American PSID, Canadian SLID and 
British BHPS, based on common definitions. For detailed information refer to the standard Equivalent File 
documentation in Burkhauser, Butrica, Daly, and Lillard (2001). The codebooks are available at 
http://www.human.cornell.edu/che/PAM/Research/Centers-Programs. 
10 The tax burdens provided here are based upon updated and modified tax calculation routines developed by Schwarze. 
(2003). The tax burden includes income taxes and payroll taxes (health, unemployment, retirement insurance and 
nursing home insurance taxes). 
11 Van Praag (2007 p. 18) simply argues that “All these specifications amount to different specifications of the labeling 
system of the underlying indifference curves, but the indifference curves themselves are unchanged and are these 
indifference curves which are estimated, either by Ordered Probit, Logit or what else.” 
12 For a robustness check with random effect ordered probit see section 6.   11
After estimating the specification (1) and in order to single out the relational from the 
income effect we replace real household income with equivalised real household income computed 
using different equivalence scales (whose characteristics are summarized in Table 1 and described 
in the paragraph below).  




EI =                         ( 2 )  
where EI is the equivalent income that equals the total disposable household income (DI), divided 
by family size (fs) raised to the power (e). Scale economies can be thought of as a function of (e). 
At one extreme, where (e) equals 1, no economies of scale exist and a family of two members 
requires twice as much disposable income as a family of one member to reach the same level of 
equivalent income. In this way, each individual is assigned the per capita income of his/her 
household. At the other extreme, (e) equals 0 and economies of scale are perfect so that a household 
of two, or a household of any number, can live exactly as well as a household of one with no 
increase in their disposable income.  
In our analysis we make use of different equivalence scales, following two different (the 
normative and the stated utility) approaches.  
 
 
4.1 Equivalence scale under the normative approach: description and econometric findings 
The normative approach is based on revealed preferences and it is commonly used in research on 
inequality. Here we include both the scales based on a consistent methodology, with adjustments 
for differences in scale economies determined by actual consumption patterns, and the so-called 
“expert scales” which are based on expert judgments or political considerations.   12
Germany has an official equivalence scale which is derived from the proportions of the Social 
Assistance benefit
13. German welfare benefits are based on the concept of the cost of a "basket of 
goods" necessary to satisfy basic needs (see Table 1 for the algorithm). German public welfare 
benefits can be considered "poverty" thresholds and the rules governing the level of benefits for 
different types of families provide an implicit equivalence scale. This scale implies very low returns 
to scale. 
Among the “expert scales” we consider the “OECD-modified equivalence scale” adopted in the late 
1990s by the OECD, jointly with the Statistical Office of the European Union (EUROSTAT). This 
scale, first proposed by Haagenars et al. (1994), assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to 
each additional adult member and of 0.3 to each child.
14 Recently, OECD publications comparing 
income inequality and poverty across countries use a scale which divides household income by the 
square root of household size. This implies that, for instance, a household of four persons has needs 
twice as large as one composed by a single person.  
Table 2 presents the results from a linear fixed effect model on the overall (East and West) 
sample where children are defined as those below 18 years living in the household and the different 
equivalence scales are applied. As explained before, estimates with equivalised income (if the 
correct scale is adopted) should absorb the economic effect of having children in the income 
coefficient and leave out the non economic effect only. Our results suggest that the latter is positive 
and significant, at least for the highest scale elasticities. When elasticity is equal to 1, the equivalent 
income corresponds to per capita income and the estimated sign for children turns from significant 
and negative (in the estimate with household income in Table 2, column 1) to significant and 
                                                 
13 The research carried out by Burkhauser et al. (1996) suggests that the official German scale is not consistent with 
other measures of economies of scale for Germany or other countries. We refer to these authors for details. 
14 We also estimated the model using the old Oxford scale created by OECD in 1982 (assigning a value of 1 to the first 
household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child (age below 14)) and the ELES scale, 
obtained from consumption or expenditure data by estimating the system of demand equation for Germany by Merz et 
al. (1993). Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.   13
positive (Table 2, column 2). The same does not happen for the presence of adults in the household 
(positive but not significant sign).
15  
Therefore, with scale elasticity equal to one (per capita household income), satisfaction with life 
increases in the number of children after the introduction of the scale effect which corrects for the 
economic cost of one’s own offspring. As the value of the scale elasticity decreases (i.e. the 
economies of scale in the household consumption get larger), the coefficient of children has a 
decreasing impact on subjective well being (SWB). In terms of magnitude, it starts from 0.049 
when we use per household member income and falls to around .030 with the official GES (Table 
2, columns 1-2 respectively). It falls below 0.02 with the modified OECD scale, becoming not 
significant. When we account for the real household income without correcting for the family size 
the children coefficient becomes negative (Tab. 2, column 4).   
If we consider that our different estimates identify discrete points in the evolution of the effect 
of when income moves along the 0-1 continuum of the scale elasticity segment, we find that the 
threshold scale elasticity which marks the border from the positive and significant to the 
insignificant effect of the number of children on life satisfaction is between the Official German 
Equivalence Scale (GES) and the modified OECD scale, while the threshold between the positive 
but not significant and the negative and significant effect is between the squared and the zero 
elasticity scale (Tab. 2, column 4). This suggests that the effect of having an additional child 
becomes positive and significant only when we take into account the negative economic effect with 
a scale elasticity at least above 0.5.
16  
 
                                                 
15 Consider however that the positive effect of the partner may already be captured by the positive and significant effect 
of the marriage status, a result which is common to most empirical papers on the determinants of life satisfaction. 
16 It is important to remark that our findings cannot be directly compared with those of Clark et al. (2008) documenting 
positive but temporary effect of child births around the event date, because we look at a permanent and not temporary 
effect of children. Actually, by replicating the approach of Clark et al. (2008) to our data we find very similar results 
related to their object of analysis.   14
4.2  Equivalence scale under the stated utility approach: description and econometric findings 
 
The equivalence scales presented above try to asses the cost of children by using budget analysis or 
normative budgets. The approach based on the demand analysis relies on the arbitrary assumption 
that the level of welfare of the two families is assumed to be equal if they have the same 
consumption of adult goods, but the identification of commodities and services consumed by adults 
is based on the researchers’ judgment (Van Praag, 2007)
17. On the contrary, the normative approach 
depends on the opinion of nutritional experts.  
The general critique of Van Praag (2007) on normative based scales is that equivalence implies 
equal satisfaction. The more direct way to evaluate it is therefore to ask individuals their level of 
satisfaction, provided that the same levels of satisfaction declared find correspondence to 
equivalence in satisfaction. 
In accordance with this perspective we make use of a second approach based on the stated level 
of utility. Following Schwarze (2003), we estimate the equivalence scale elasticity directly from the 
income satisfaction question available in the panel. Satisfaction with current household income is 
recorded on a range from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied).  
To develop this approach, we estimate in a first stage a linear fixed effect model from the 
income satisfaction equation 
() it i jit
j
j it it c X EI FinSat ε γ β β + + + + = ∑ ln 1 0
*        ( 2 )  
where FinSat* is the financial satisfaction latent continuous variable of the individual i at time t, X-
variables pick up socio-demographic characteristics of the individual, and EI is, as before, the 
equivalent household income. Substituting the equivalent income expression in (2) into the income 
satisfaction equation, we obtain  
                                                 
17 Quoting Van Praag (2007, p.19). “First, what are adult goods: alcoholics, cigarettes, a haircut? The second point is 
that a couple with a child may have a completely different consumption pattern as a couple without adults without 
being less or more satisfied. It is probable that most parents will drink less than couples without child, but would that 















+ = ∑ ln 1 0
*       ( 3 )  
where fs is family size. Rearranging we get 
it i i it it it it c X fs DI FinSat ε γ β β β + + + + + = ) ln( ) ln( 2 1 0
*      (3’) 
where  1 2 β β e − = . Hence, the equivalence scale elasticity can be estimated as the ratio between the 
parameter of the current household income, declared in the survey, and the estimated parameter of 





− = e                                (4) 
We then estimate equation (3’) and equation (1) in which income is equivalised with the scale 
elasticity drawn from the financial satisfaction estimate using a fixed effect linear model. In our 
panel specification we include both household income, divided by the consumer price index 
provided by the official statistics of the CNEF which is computed differently for East and West 
Germany, and time dummies to capture socio economic trends for each wave of the survey.  
Results from the stated level of utility approach confirm the positive and significant effect of the 
number of children once household income is equivalised using the elasticity of scale estimated in 
the financial satisfaction equation (Tab. 2, column 6). The estimated elasticity is equal to 0.28 (very 
close to the Official GES scale).  
 
5.  Econometric findings in subsample splits 
The hypothesis of slope homogeneity implicitly assumed in our estimate on the aggregate sample is 
quite restrictive. It is in fact reasonable to believe that the cost/value of having children is crucially 
affected by gender, income and culture. Subsample splits yield indeed interesting results and 
provide evidence of slope heterogeneity in the number of children/life satisfaction relationship. Our 
discriminating variables are East/West Germany location, gender and income.    16
Differently from the overall sample estimates, the number of children coefficient in the East 
Germany subsample is never negative with the exception of the base estimate with household 
income. Indeed, for all the equivalised scales, the coefficient is significant and strongly positive 
(Table 3). In terms of magnitude, with scale elasticity 1 (per capita income), the effect is around 
three times larger than the estimated aggregate sample effect in Table 2. Results in the West 
German sample are quite different: the effect of children in the non equivalised income estimate is 
negative and significant while the effect of children is positive and significant only when using unit 
scale elasticity (per member household income).  
Since the results found for the two geographical locations are so different, we consider 
gender and income split inside the West German and East German sample, as shown in Tables 4.a 
and 4.b
18 respectively  
The split around the median household income yields polarised results as well showing that 
poorer individuals tend to value more having children. In the below median income subsample, the 
relational effect of children is positive and significant with all the scale elasticities under both 
(revealed preference and stated level of utility) approaches for East Germans, while it is positive 
and significant up to the OECD modified scale (and in the stated level of utility approach) for West 
Germans. In the above median income subsample the number of children variable is negative and 
significant in the base estimate and never significantly positive with the reaming types of 
equivalised income for West Germany. In the East, the aggregate effect (base estimates) is instead 
not significant. When we equivalise income we get a positive and significant effect up to the OECD 
modified scale (and in the first stated level of utility approach).  
The gender split also gives interesting results. Children related life satisfaction seems to be 
higher for males. For men in the West the number of children coefficient is not significant in the 
base estimate, while positive and significant only with the highest scale elasticity (per capita 
income). By contrast, women in the West exhibit a negative and significant coefficient in the base 
                                                 
18 Tables 4.a and b contains the variable of interest: childHH (number of children below 18 years old in the household) 
and offspring (dummy for having children). The second variable will be the object of study in section7.   17
(non equivalised income) estimate and never have a significantly positive effect in any of the 
equivalised income estimates.  The gender difference is strong in East Germany as well. Men in the 
East exhibit a non significant aggregate effect in the base estimate and an always positive and 
significant effect with all equivalised income estimates. On the contrary, women in the East have 
positive and significant non economic effects up to the modified OECD scale and with the stated 
level of utility approach. 
A plausible general interpretation of these results is that the non economic effect of the 
number of children is higher when the opportunity cost of having children is lower. If household 
income is a good proxy of hourly wage and productivity, the opportunity cost is higher in richer 
than in poorer families and in the West than in the East Germany due to differences in per capita 
income. It is also presumably higher for the parent which is expected to spend more time with 
children (generally women, and all the more so when rearing babies after birth since maternity still 
exceeds by far paternity leaves).  
Subsample splits also help us to shed some light on other interpretations of the 
children/happiness paradox (i.e. why individuals have children if the composite effect of the latter 
do not increase their life satisfaction ?). Omitted findings lead us to reject the hypothesis that the 
paradox disappears once we eliminate single, separated and divorced mothers from the sample.
19 
We also observe that the total effect of children for individuals older than 55 in estimates with non 
equivalised income becomes positive under certain scale elasticities. This finding gives some 
support to the variability of children-life satisfaction effect during the life cycle: children are a 
burden when parents are young but contribute to life satisfaction when they are older.
20 The 
problem here is that we have no elements to validate the concurring assumption needed to accept 
this interpretation, that is, that future life satisfaction is not correctly anticipated by parents in their 
early age.  
                                                 
19 Results are omitted and available upon request. 
20 Results are omitted and available upon request.   18
We also find some evidence consistent with the commitment hypothesis. While the religious 
practice split does not make any difference in the life satisfaction effect of having children, we find, 
in a parallel fixed effect panel estimate (in which the number of children is regressed as dependent 
variable on socio-economic characteristics), that the religious practice dummy has positive and 
significant effects on the dependent variable.
21 A plausible interpretation of this finding is that 
deontological motivations lead individuals to have children even though they do not add to their 
declared life satisfaction. 
 
6. Calculating the non economic benefit of having children 
In this section we intend to calculate the magnitude of the significant effects commented so far. To 
this purpose we calculate the compensating surplus (henceforth also CS) of an additional child for 
the individual i measured as: 
() Pi Y CS i t i Δ − =
− ) * ( ˆ exp 1 (
1
1 2 0 , α α                ( 7 )    
where α2 is the coefficient of the number of children variable and α1 is the coefficient of income. 
The methodology we follow is common to other empirical papers in happiness studies such as those 
valuing air pollution (Welsch, 2002 and Luechinger, 2007), terrorist activity (Frey et al., 2009), 
noise nuisance (van Praag and Baarsma, 2005) and flood disasters (Luechinger and Raschky, 2009). 
These authors underline that the life satisfaction approach overcomes the limits of the revealed 
preference one (the value of non market goods cannot be revealed by consumer choices) and the 
contingent evaluation approach where individuals are directly asked to estimate the willingness to 
pay for a given good (and their declaration may be cognitively too demanding and highly suspect of 
interview bias due to strategic declaration). 
As it is well known this approach is subject to several shortcomings. First of all, available 
empirical evidence shows fairly conclusively that monetary compensations have a greater effect on 
SWB at lower levels of income (Diener and Seligman, 2004; Fahey and Smyth, 2004). Van Praag 
                                                 
21 Results are omitted and available upon request.   19
and Baarsma (2005) point out that this has the politically problematic implication that 
compensation for an attribute which is detrimental to happiness will be greater for those with higher 
incomes. Perhaps more problematic is the fact that the coefficient on income has generally been 
found to be fairly small and, in some datasets, insignificant (Wildman and Jones, 2002) or even 
negative (Clark 2003, Clark and Oswald, 1994). 
For these reasons, and in order to provide the reader with a broader view of our results, we 
follow two different approaches. The first is the standard compensating surplus which uses as 
ingredients the marginal effect of income and the marginal effect of children. The second approach 
compares the marginal effect of children depurated from the economic effect (captured by the 
selected equivalised income) with the actual economic cost of an additional children. The latter is 
simply calculated as the equivalised income with the current number of children minus the 
equivalised income under the hypothesis of an additional child.
22 
Tables 5.a and 5.b show the magnitude of the relevant effects for all general and subgroup 
splits by gender and income estimated in the West and East German samples. For simplicity we 
restrict the analysis to a limited number of equivalent scales between the two extremes of per capita 
income and household income. Calculations are provided only when coefficients are statistically 
significant in the original estimates.  
By looking at the base estimates (those with household income) we find that in West 
Germany the aggregate life satisfaction effect is always negative and significant, with the exception 
of individuals below the median household income (who report a negative compensating surplus of 
861  (2002) Euros for an additional child). On average, an additional child requires a compensation 
of 5,537 Euros.  The compensation is higher for females and individuals above the median income 
(8,006 and 8,675 Euros respectively).    
When we use the highest scale elasticity (e = 1) and estimate the model with per capita 
income in the West German sample, we find that an additional children has a positive (non 
                                                 
22 Note that, also in the second case, the calculation of the non economic effect of children remains subject to the 
problem of the measurement bias in the marginal utility of income.    20
economic) effect equal to 1,739 Euros. Note that this benefit is lower than the actual income loss 
(3,912 Euros) and therefore the aggregate effect is negative also with this second approach, 
consistently with the result of the compensating surplus. However, if we compare the (income) cost 
and the (relational) benefit, the aggregate loss is lower (less than one half) than that arising from the 
compensating surplus approach (around 2,200 Euros).  
As commented in previous estimates, East Germans never have a negative aggregate life 
satisfaction effect, while they show a positive one in the below median income subgroup. The 
benefit of an additional children calculated with the CS is in this case equal to 10,144 Euros. Note 
that, whatever the scale elasticity applied, the relational benefit of an additional children calculated 
with the CS (5,991 Euros for the overall East German sample with per capita income) is always 
larger than the actual loss of income calculated on the basis of the change in the equivalised income 
due to a new birth. If we combine this evidence and look only at significant results, this implies that 
the social returns of a small subsidy on children are remarkable in the East German sample: a small 
amount of money may in fact trigger a relational effect which is highly valuable (in monetary 
terms). 
To sum up, individuals with high opportunity costs need to be subsidized in order to 
consider the children a positive determinant of their life satisfaction. As anticipated above, this has 
the politically problematic implication of subsidizing the rich and not the poor (but also the more 
reasonable gender implication of subsidizing women who usually bear a higher burden in raising 
children). However, for some borderline groups (with insignificant aggregate effect and non 
economic effect larger than the economic loss) our findings show that small subsidies generate high 
social returns.  
Again, we remind here that the effectiveness of policies calculated on the basis of our results 
strictly depends on the solutions provided to the children-happiness paradox. Only if the latter can 
be solved within the self interested rationality paradigm individuals will react as expected to 
monetary incentives (i.e. if individuals decide to have children for purely deontological reasons   21
they will continue to have them even though a demographic control policy would tax them). In the 
section which follows we will provide some indications on the plausibility of several rationales for 
the paradox based on our analysis. 
 
7. Limits of our approach and robustness check 
Equivalence scales try to be specific with respect to the age composition of the household, so that 
they weight differently children below 14 years and teenagers dependent from their parents until 
they reach the age of 18. Consider that, if we take into account the different cost of the latter on the 
household budget (as the modified and the Official GES and the modified OECD scale do), we 
should even test whether they generate different satisfaction in the family budget.
23 In other words, 
if we allow them to weight differently on the family budget, we can indentify also their different 
non economic effect on parents’ life satisfaction. Table 6 shows the different coefficients for 
children below 14 and from 15 to 18 years old. The parameters are sensible to the choice of the 
equivalent scale. We observe that the two coefficients differ only when the computed equivalence 
scale weight differently their contribution. Table 6 also shows that the coefficient magnitude for 0-
14 aged children is almost the same as for 15-18 aged ones. The magnitude is slightly higher for 
younger children in the per capita scale, while with the squared scale older children are only weakly 
significant. 
For a second robustness check consider as well that what we did in section 4 is testing a 
strong version (constant marginal effect) of the hypothesis of the relational value of children. A 
question arising from our estimates is whether the effect of an additional child is constant 
independently from the number of children. It is probably unlikely to be so. It must be noted 
however that around 90 percent of respondents with children have less than three of them (only 
1,252 individuals declared to have 3 children, 295 individuals 4 children, 81 individuals 5 children 
and, finally, 17 individuals 6 children). It is therefore highly likely that our linear effect is mainly 
                                                 
23 This is just an approximation as the relational effect may be different according to children age for reasons which are 
different from the budgetary ones considered in the economic effect.   22
based on effect of the first and the second children given the low weight in our estimate of 
respondents with more than two children. 
In order to overcome this problem the positive relational effect of children can be tested in a 
different way. That is, by using a dummy which takes value one when individuals have children and 
zero otherwise (we call this variable offspring in Tables 4a and b). Results with this different 
approach are similar to those of the number of children estimates even though stronger when we 
consider West Germany (Table 4.a). In the aggregate West German sample estimates having 
children is negative but not significant (as the number of children effect) in the base estimates with 
no equivalised income. Having children has positive and significant effect in the per capita income 
estimate with a magnitude which is around three times stronger than the number of children effect 
in Table 2. Having versus not having children affects more positively life satisfaction than the 
number of children effect also in the poor West subsample where the impact is always positive and 
significant including the base estimate.   
On the contrary, in the East German sample the effect of having versus not having children 
altogether is not much different than the number of children effect and, in some cases, even weaker 
(Tab. 4b).  
In a final robustness check we verify whether our main findings are robust to alternative 
estimation methods. We perform a random effect ordered probit estimate on the aggregate sample 




Why individuals decide to have children if life satisfaction estimates often exhibit a negative and 
significant  number-of- children coefficient? What is the life satisfaction effect of the economic and 
non economic consequences of having children and can the two effects be decomposed? 
                                                 
24 Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.   23
Both questions are relevant in different respects. We want to know whether the decision of 
having children can be framed under the standard utility maximization approach and we are 
interested in extracting the non economic effect of children as it may be useful in welfare policies 
and, more generally, in all those situations in which the social (non economic) cost of children 
needs to be calculated separately from the economic cost of having them. However, at a closer look, 
the issues of the paradox and the decomposition driven policies are strictly connected since, only if 
the former can be explained by rational self-interest, individuals react to monetary incentives. In our 
paper we try to provide evidence to answer to these two questions with an empirical analysis on the 
GSOEP.  
First of all, we find a negative and significant effect of the number of children in the overall 
sample estimate which includes (non equivalised) household income among regressors. This result 
confirms the paradox.  However, when we calculate the impact of having children vis-à-vis not 
having them the aggregate effect in the overall sample estimate is no more significant. Furthermore, 
when we equivalise income with selected equivalence scales, and, by doing so, we separate the 
economic from the non economic effect of children, we find that the latter becomes positive and 
significant under several scale elasticities closer to unity.   
The analysis of selected sample splits leads us to reject homogeneity of the slope coefficient 
under inquiry. The (non decomposed) number of children effect tends to be more negative for 
females, individuals above the median household income in the sample and for West than for East 
Germans (it is indeed positive and significant for East Germans who are below the East median 
household income).  We interpret these results as consistent with the expected difference in 
opportunity costs of children’s care among these groups.  
Some additional findings help to shed light on the children-happiness paradox. In this paper 
we do not have the ambition to find the definite answer to it, but rather to provide some related 
evidence which may help to exclude or reinforce some of the potential explanations. With this 
respect, a first result is that excluding single, separated and divorced mothers does not change our   24
findings. We find however that the effect of children life satisfaction is more positive in individuals 
above 55. If individuals do not include future expected life satisfaction in their declaration, they 
could have children because benefits when old overcome costs when young. Finally, some evidence 
of deontological behavior cannot be excluded. Some categories (such as individuals with frequent 
religious practice) have more children even though their life satisfaction does not seem to be 
positively affected by them.  
Finally, our decomposition findings would obviously not reject the hypothesis that people 
mainly look at the non economic effects of having children underestimating their negative impact 
on per member available household income. 
To sum up, there are many different explanations which are compatible with the paradox. 
Without abandoning the hypothesis of self-interested rationality, the latter might be explained when 
moving from the linear effect of the number of children on that of having them versus not having 
altogether (but in such case it should not work for the second child effect) or, by considering that in 
relevant subgroups with lower opportunity costs (males, below median income individuals, East 
Germans) the paradox tends to disappear. By enlarging the scope to motivational complexity, the 
paradox is perfectly compatible with forms of deontological behavior. If we finally abandon the 
rationality paradigm, misprediction of the future benefit of having children (or omitted inclusion of 
them in the life satisfaction declaration) or underestimation of the income effect of children, when 
comparing it with the positive non economic effect, are alternative explanations for the observed 
findings in the children-happiness relationship. 
From the policy side, our calculations of compensating surplus and of the magnitude of the 
economic and non economic effects show that (when the paradox is not explained by departures 
from rationality) women subsidies could be decisive to tilt the balance in favor of child generating 
decisions.  
If we relate our results to the consolidated ones of the development literature on women 
education we find that they are the two sides of the same phenomenon. If female education (and the   25
consequent increase in their opportunity cost of having children) was one of the most effective 
measures reducing explosive demographic trends in developing countries, life satisfaction evidence 
tells us that subsidies to women can compensate too high opportunity costs to avoid fertility 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Life Satisfaction for individuals with below 18 year old offspring: 
men.   27
Table 1. Summary of equivalence scale weights and elasticities. 
Per capita Income  weight  No. household member 
 
  description   No economies of scale exist and a family of two requires twice as much 
disposable income as a family of one to reach the same level of equivalent 
income. In this way, each person is assigned the per capita income of his or 
her household. 
  elasticity e=  1 
Official German 
Equivalence Weight  
weight  OffESG =1.00 *for household head 
+ 0.50*children 0-7 in 2 parent hh 
+ 0.55*children 0-7 in lone parent hh 
+ 0.65*children 8-14 
+ 0.90*children 15-18 
+ 0.90*adults <18 minus one for household head 
  elasticity  e = 0.71 
"OECD-modified scale"  weight  OECDmodeqSc = 1.00 *for household head  
+ 0.5*adults <14  minus one for household head 
+ 0.3* children 0-14 
  elasticity  e = 0.53 
Square root scale  weight  Squeqsc = No. household member ^(1/2) 
  elasticity  e = 0.50 
No equivalence scale 
weight 
weight  no correction for household size  
  description  The economies of scale are assumed to be perfect so that a household of 
two can live exactly as well as a household of one with no increase in their 
disposable income. Operationally each person is assigned the income of his 
or her entire household 














Table 2. Life Satisfaction Fixed Effect Regression for different equivalent income and number 
of children: all samples  
VARIABLES  Base  PerCapita  Official GES Modified OECD Squared  Schwarze 
Scale elasticity  0  1  0.71  0.53  0.50  0.69 
Equivalised Income  0.218***  0.213***  0.208***  0.220***  0.219***  0.217*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
childHH -0.021*  0.049***  0.030**  0.019  0.015  0.028** 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
nonchildHH -0.078***  0.003  0.003 -0.021**  -0.038***  -0.023** 
 (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Age17_19 -0.385  -0.381  -0.378  -0.381  -0.383  -0.382 
 (0.283)  (0.283)  (0.283)  (0.283)  (0.283)  (0.283) 
Age20_22 -0.485*  -0.481*  -0.499*  -0.482* -0.483*  -0.482* 
 (0.272)  (0.272)  (0.272)  (0.272)  (0.272)  (0.272) 
Age23_25 -0.422  -0.419  -0.439*  -0.421  -0.421  -0.420 
 (0.260)  (0.260)  (0.260)  (0.260)  (0.260)  (0.260) 
Age26_28 -0.373  -0.371  -0.390  -0.374  -0.372  -0.372 
 (0.248)  (0.248)  (0.248)  (0.248)  (0.248)  (0.248) 
Age29_31 -0.299  -0.296  -0.315  -0.301  -0.298  -0.298 
 (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.236) 
Age32_34 -0.274  -0.271  -0.287  -0.276  -0.273  -0.272 
 (0.224)  (0.224)  (0.224)  (0.224)  (0.224)  (0.224) 
Age35_37 -0.225  -0.222  -0.233  -0.226  -0.224  -0.224 
 (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.211) 
Age38_40 -0.202  -0.200  -0.205  -0.201  -0.201  -0.201 
 (0.199)  (0.199)  (0.199)  (0.199)  (0.199)  (0.199) 
Age41_43 -0.171  -0.169  -0.170  -0.167  -0.170  -0.170 
 (0.187)  (0.187)  (0.187)  (0.187)  (0.187)  (0.187) 
Age44_46 -0.158  -0.157  -0.156  -0.154  -0.158  -0.157 
 (0.175)  (0.175)  (0.175)  (0.175)  (0.175)  (0.175) 
Age47_49 -0.121  -0.120  -0.122  -0.117  -0.121  -0.121 
 (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.163) 
Age50_52 -0.079  -0.078  -0.081  -0.076  -0.079  -0.078 
 (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.152) 
Age53_55 -0.037  -0.035  -0.039  -0.034  -0.037  -0.036 
 (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.140) 
Age56_58 0.098  0.101  0.096  0.100  0.099  0.099 
 (0.128)  (0.128)  (0.128)  (0.128)  (0.128)  (0.128) 
Age59_61 0.239**  0.241**  0.237**  0.241** 0.240**  0.240** 
 (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.116) 
Age62_64 0.355***  0.357***  0.353***  0.357***  0.356***  0.356*** 
 (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105) 
Age65_67 0.444***  0.446***  0.442***  0.446***  0.445***  0.445*** 
 (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.095) 
Age68_70 0.407***  0.408***  0.405***  0.408***  0.407***  0.408*** 
 (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)   29
Table 2. Life Satisfaction Fixed Effect Regression for different equivalent income and number 
of children: all samples (follows) 
Age71_73 0.387***  0.388***  0.386***  0.388***  0.387***  0.388*** 
 (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.073) 
Age74_76 0.305***  0.306***  0.304***  0.306***  0.305***  0.306*** 
 (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
Age77_79 0.183***  0.183***  0.182***  0.183***  0.183***  0.183*** 
 (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
Unemployed -0.278***  -0.278***  -0.278***  -0.277***  -0.277***  -0.277*** 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Loss of job  -0.100***  -0.099***  -0.100***  -0.100***  -0.100***  -0.100*** 
 (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Employed 0.112***  0.112***  0.114***  0.112***  0.111***  0.111*** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Retired 0.080***  0.082***  0.082***  0.080***  0.081***  0.081*** 
 (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Married 0.092***  0.118***  0.104***  0.097***  0.105***  0.110*** 
 (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Marriage 0.254***  0.249***  0.254***  0.255***  0.252***  0.251*** 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Separated -0.117*  -0.115*  -0.124*  -0.122*  -0.116*  -0.116* 
 (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Separation -0.333***  -0.334***  -0.334***  -0.333***  -0.333***  -0.333*** 
 (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074) 
Divorced 0.094*  0.099*  0.090  0.091*  0.096*  0.097* 
 (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Divorce -0.161***  -0.161***  -0.161***  -0.161***  -0.161***  -0.161*** 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Widowed -0.263***  -0.285***  -0.290***  -0.280***  -0.274***  -0.279*** 
 (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Education years  0.017**  0.017**  0.016**  0.017**  0.017**  0.017** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
House Owner  0.069***  0.072***  0.072***  0.070***  0.070***  0.070*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Hosp -0.208***  -0.208***  -0.209***  -0.208***  -0.208***  -0.208*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Constant 4.796***  4.779***  4.812***  4.753***  4.773***  4.772*** 
 (0.215)  (0.216)  (0.215)  (0.216)  (0.216)  (0.216) 
Observations 160046  160046  160046  160046  160046  160046 
Number of persnr  16170  16170  16170  16170  16170  16170 
R-squared 0.041  0.040  0.040  0.041  0.041  0.041 
Notes: Variable definition: see section 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.   30
Table 3. Life Satisfaction Fixed Effect Regression for different equivalent income and number 













OECD  Squared Schw 
 West  East 
Equivalent  Income 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.194*** 0.309*** 0.305*** 0.284*** 0.317*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
childHH  -0.037***  0.025* 0.009  -0.002 -0.006 0.010  0.035  0.139***  0.107***  0.096***  0.087***  0.100*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
nonchildHH  -0.074***  -0.002 -0.001 -0.023**  -0.038*** -0.020*  -0.100*** 0.015  0.014  -0.020 -0.043**  -0.029 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Age17_19  -0.557*  -0.552 -0.550 -0.554 -0.555 -0.554 0.194  0.195  0.192  0.200  0.195  0.195 
  (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.493) (0.493) (0.493) (0.493) (0.493) (0.493) 
Age20_22  -0.658** -0.653** -0.669** -0.656** -0.656** -0.654** 0.107  0.107  0.077  0.113  0.108  0.108 
  (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) 
Age23_25  -0.592* -0.588* -0.606* -0.591* -0.590* -0.589* 0.160  0.162  0.129  0.164  0.162  0.162 
  (0.311) (0.311) (0.311) (0.311) (0.311) (0.311) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) 
Age26_28  -0.569* -0.566* -0.583**  -0.569* -0.568* -0.567* 0.266  0.269  0.237  0.267  0.268  0.268 
  (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434) (0.434) 
Age29_31  -0.478* -0.475* -0.491* -0.479* -0.477* -0.476* 0.299  0.303  0.272  0.298  0.301  0.302 
  (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.414) (0.413) (0.413) (0.413) (0.413) (0.413) 
Age32_34  -0.424 -0.421 -0.436 -0.426 -0.423 -0.422 0.245  0.249  0.223  0.242  0.247  0.248 
  (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.394) (0.393) (0.394) (0.394) (0.394) (0.394) 
Age35_37  -0.363 -0.360 -0.371 -0.364 -0.362 -0.361 0.255  0.258  0.243  0.256  0.257  0.257 
  (0.252) (0.252) (0.252) (0.252) (0.252) (0.252) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) 
Age38_40  -0.336 -0.333 -0.339 -0.336 -0.335 -0.334 0.263  0.264  0.260  0.269  0.264  0.264 
  (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.351) (0.351) (0.351) (0.351) (0.351) (0.351) 
Age41_43  -0.294 -0.292 -0.293 -0.291 -0.293 -0.293 0.274  0.274  0.270  0.284  0.274  0.274 
  (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) (0.331) 
Age44_46  -0.281 -0.280 -0.279 -0.278 -0.281 -0.281 0.287  0.287  0.280  0.297  0.287  0.287 
  (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.311) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310) (0.311) (0.310) 
Age47_49  -0.212 -0.211 -0.211 -0.208 -0.212 -0.211 0.237  0.239  0.226  0.246  0.238  0.238 
  (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.292) (0.292) (0.292) (0.292) (0.292) (0.292) 
Age50_52  -0.174 -0.172 -0.175 -0.171 -0.173 -0.173 0.276  0.278  0.263  0.283  0.277  0.277 
  (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) 
Age53_55  -0.134 -0.132 -0.135 -0.132 -0.134 -0.133 0.314  0.315  0.301  0.320  0.315  0.315 
  (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.253) (0.252) (0.252) (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) 
Age56_58  0.034 0.037 0.033 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.361 0.364 0.350 0.367 0.363 0.363 
  (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) 
Age59_61  0.174 0.177 0.173 0.176 0.175 0.176 0.508**  0.511**  0.498**  0.514**  0.510**  0.510** 
  (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) 
Age62_64  0.252** 0.254** 0.250** 0.253** 0.252** 0.253** 0.701***  0.704***  0.692***  0.706***  0.703***  0.703*** 
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) 
Age65_67  0.350*** 0.351*** 0.348*** 0.351*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.776*** 0.779*** 0.768*** 0.781*** 0.778*** 0.778*** 
  (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) 
Age68_70  0.348*** 0.349*** 0.347*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.656*** 0.659*** 0.650*** 0.660*** 0.658*** 0.658*** 
  (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164)   31
Table 3. Life Satisfaction Fixed Effect Regression for different equivalent income and number 
of children: splits West and East samples (follows) 
 
Age71_73  0.326*** 0.327*** 0.325*** 0.327*** 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.644*** 0.648*** 0.641*** 0.648*** 0.646*** 0.647*** 
 (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Age74_76  0.260*** 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.511*** 0.515*** 0.510*** 0.515*** 0.514*** 0.514*** 
 (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Age77_79  0.129** 0.129** 0.129** 0.130** 0.129** 0.129** 0.423***  0.424***  0.422***  0.425***  0.424***  0.424*** 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Unemp  -0.306*** -0.307*** -0.307*** -0.306*** -0.306*** -0.307*** -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.216*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.214***
 (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
lossjob  -0.063 -0.062 -0.062 -0.063 -0.062 -0.062 -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.157***  -0.158***  -0.157*** -0.157***
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Emp  0.074*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.227*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 0.223*** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) 
Retired  0.051 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.215***  0.217***  0.217***  0.216***  0.216***  0.216*** 
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Married  0.124*** 0.150*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.137*** 0.143*** -0.020  0.002  -0.012  -0.018  -0.009  -0.006 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
getMar  0.258*** 0.253*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.241*** 0.237*** 0.241*** 0.243*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Separated  -0.157** -0.153** -0.161** -0.161** -0.155** -0.154** 0.002  -0.006  -0.017  -0.009  -0.002  -0.003 
 (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
getSep  -0.342***  -0.344*** -0.343***  -0.342*** -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.286** -0.285** -0.287** -0.287** -0.285** -0.285** 
 (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) 
Divorced  0.095 0.099 0.092 0.093 0.097 0.098 0.107 0.111 0.099 0.101 0.110 0.110 
 (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
getDiv  -0.192***  -0.191*** -0.191***  -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.191*** -0.076 -0.081 -0.081 -0.078 -0.078 -0.079 
 (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Widowed  -0.298***  -0.316*** -0.322***  -0.312*** -0.307*** -0.312*** -0.089 -0.135 -0.134 -0.120 -0.112 -0.118 
 (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) 
nEdyear  0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.023  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Owner2  0.066*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.063*  0.065*  0.068*  0.064*  0.063*  0.064* 
 (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Hosp  -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.211***
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Time  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  4.277*** 4.304*** 4.314*** 4.259*** 4.279*** 4.288*** 3.754*** 3.728*** 3.840*** 3.669*** 3.714*** 3.712*** 
 (0.330)  (0.339)  (0.339) (0.335) (0.334) (0.337) (0.367) (0.370) (0.366) (0.370) (0.369) (0.369) 
Observations  116720 116720 116720 116720 116720 116720 43326  43326  43326  43326  43326  43326 
R-squared  0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 
Number  of  persnr  11297 11297 11297 11297 11297 11297 4873  4873  4873  4873  4873  4873 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Tab. 4.a Life satisfaction fixed effect regression, Splits into West German sample (by gender, 
by median income) comparing offspring and children. 
VARIABLES  Base  PerCapita Official GES Modified OECD  Squared  Schwarze
West DT (all sub sample)           
childHH -0.037***  0.025*  0.009  -0.002  -0.006  0.010 
   (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
offspring -0.022  0.065***  0.042*  0.027  0.022  0.044** 
   (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Male           
childHH -0.026  0.036*  0.018  0.010  0.006  0.021 
   (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
offspring -0.003  -0.003  0.061**  0.049  0.043  0.065** 
   (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Female           
childHH -0.060***  0.005  -0.013  -0.024  -0.028  -0.011 
   (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
offspring -0.055*  0.030  0.007  -0.008  -0.013  0.008 
   (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Rich           
childHH -0.048***  0.016  -0.003  -0.009  -0.015  0.001 
   (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
offspring -0.054**  0.027  0.007  -0.000  -0.010  0.010 
   (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
Poor           
childHH 0.008  0.070***  0.053**  0.042*  0.039  0.055** 
   (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
offspring 0.080*  0.172***  0.145***  0.129***  0.126***  0.149***
   (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.042) 
Notes: All regressions include socio demographic controls for employment status, marital status, age dummies, years of 
education, house owner dummy, health status, regional and time dummies as additional variables. Excluded categories: 
single, over 79 years old, house renter, not hospital stay previous year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Riches (poors) are defined as those individuals having the  log real 
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Tab 4.b Life satisfaction fixed effect regression, Splits into East German sample (by gender, 
by median income) comparing offspring and children 
VARIABLES  Base  PerCapita  Official GES Modified OECD  Squared  Schwarze
East DT (all sub sample)          
childHH 0.035  0.139***  0.107***  0.096***  0.087***  0.100*** 
   (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
offspring 0.026  0.144***  0.112***  0.099***  0.089***  0.103*** 
   (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Male          
childHH 0.038  0.166***  0.127***  0.111***  0.102***  0.117*** 
   (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
offspring 0.025  0.170***  0.132***  0.114**  0.102**  0.120*** 
   (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Female          
childHH 0.015  0.104***  0.077**  0.068*  0.060  0.071* 
   (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.038) 
offspring 0.005  0.102**  0.073  0.065  0.056  0.068 
   (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Rich          
childHH 0.023  0.131***  0.084**  0.091***  0.079**  0.092*** 
   (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.035) 
offspring 0.023  0.117***  0.084*  0.093**  0.078*  0.089** 
   (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
Poor          
childHH 0.105**  0.188***  0.164***  0.152***  0.148***  0.158*** 
   (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
offspring 0.068  0.164**  0.140**  0.128**  0.123*  0.134** 
   (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
Notes: All regressions include socio demographic controls for employment status, marital status, age dummies, years of 
education, house owner dummy, health status, regional and time dummies as additional variables. Excluded categories: 
single, over 79 years old, house renter, not hospital stay previous year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Riches (poors) are defined as those individuals having the  log real 
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Tab 5.a Compensating variation: Western German sample*  
WEST Germans  PerCapita OfficialGerScale Modified OECD  Squared   Schwartze Base
all sample               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  12511.13 13514.06 17757.32  19487.23  16408.36 32042.87
compensating surplus  -1739.87     5537.93
% of mean income  -13.91     17.28
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3912.48 2714.07 2692.81  3097.27  3563.13
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  29.37 19.11 15.15  16.19  21.42
Male West               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  12832.93 13871.42 18347.90  20224.27  16959.36 33565.07
Compensating surplus  -2692.68     4072.67
% of mean income  -20.98     12.13
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3940.78 2723.53 2745.09  3157.60  3616.71
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  28.47 18.36 14.77  15.62  20.71
Female West                
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  12211.61 13181.44 17207.63  18801.21  15895.49  30626.04
Compensating surplus     8006.36
% of mean income     26.14
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3886.14 2705.26 2644.14  3041.12  3513.25
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  30.21 19.81 15.50  16.71  22.08
Rich West               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  15446.47 16878.55 23169.75  25955.54  21285.79  45336.9
Compensating surplus  non sign     8675.23
% of mean income  non sign     19.14
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  4269.91 2934.61 3236.20  3670.11  4100.44
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  25.04 15.79 13.38  13.53  18.04
Poor West               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  9572.132 10145.37 12338.15  13010.85  11524.83 18732.25
Compensating surplus  -4740.68 -3686.27 -3304.24    -861.10
% of mean income  -49.53 -36.33 -26.78    -4.60
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3554.60 2493.24 2148.73  2523.71  3025.14
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  33.70 22.43 16.92  18.85  24.80
* We do not report CS in estimates in which the coefficient for children is not significant. 
 
Tab 5.b Compensating variation: East German sample*  
EAST Germans   PerCapita OfficialGerScale Modified OECD  Squared   Schwartze Base
all subsample           
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  10377.58 11206.93 14985.94  16516.30  13810.33  27493.39
compensating surplus  -5991.36 -5127.79 -5300.48  -5292.27  -5218.01
% of mean income  -57.73 -45.76 -35.37  -32.04  -37.78
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3120.13 2146.73 2219.92  2539.08  2892.92
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  28.82 18.58 14.94  15.83  20.97
MALE East               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  10530.77 11375.07 15310.33  16942.84  14114.61 28433.17
compensating surplus  -5962.46 -5079.61 -5257.75  -5312.29  -5184.22
% of mean income  -56.62 -44.66 -34.34  -31.35  -36.73
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3108.96 2127.92 2238.86  2561.58  2905.82
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  28.15 17.99 14.65  15.41  20.44
Women East               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  10234.77 11050.18 14683.53  16118.65  13526.66 26617.26
compensating surplus  -4830.74 -4042.16 -4036.30    -3968.23
% of mean income  -47.20 -36.58 -27.49    -29.34
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3130.54 2164.26 2202.27  2518.10  2880.89
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  29.44 19.12 15.21  16.21  21.46
Rich East               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  12203.88 13331.14 18744.92  21173.07  17182.84 37736.62
compensating surplus  -5303.73    
% of mean income  -43.46    
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3168.73 2154.13 2521.77  2842.70  3129.51
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  24.28 15.14 13.08  13.05  17.44
Poor East               
income mean of (annual household income post gov tax /CPI )*100  8551.08 9082.49 11226.57  11859.03  10437.45 17249.05
compensating surplus  -11785.41 -10532.64 -10389.90  -11034.80  -10693.89 -10144.62
% of mean income  -137.82 -115.97 -92.55  -93.05  -102.46 -58.81
lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  3071.52 2139.32 1918.04  2235.42  2656.30
% lost income due to additional child (mean for the subgroup)  33.36 22.02 16.80  18.60  24.50
* We do not report CS in estimates in which the coefficient for children is not significant. 
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Table 6. Impact of equivalent household income and number of children <14 and children 15 








Equivalent  Income  0.223*** 0.222*** 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
nonchildHH -0.070***  0.005  0.008  -0.017**  -0.033*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
child_0_14 -0.010  0.059***  0.041***  0.024**  0.025*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
child_15_18 -0.004  0.046***  0.061***  0.036***  0.022* 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant  4.783*** 4.771*** 4.733*** 4.732*** 4.753*** 
  (0.148) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) (0.149) 
Observations  153935 153935 153935 153935 153935 
Number of ID  15542  15542  15542  15542  15542 
R-squared  0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 
Notes: Notes: All regressions include socio demographic controls for employment status, marital status, age dummies, 
years of education, house owner dummy, health status, regional and time dummies as additional variables. Excluded 
categories: single, over 79 years old, house renter, not hospital stay previous year. Robust standard errors in 
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Appendix (not to be published) 
Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description. 
Variable   Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max  Observations 
LifeSat  overall  6.912666  1.853388 0 10  N =  205213 
  between    1.48611 0 10  n =   18980 
 within    1.328182 -2.24118 14.48409  T-bar  =  10.8121 
HHIncSat overall  6.264239 2.283183 0 10  N  =    202101 
  between    1.880932 0 10  n =   18874 
 within    1.574194 -2.610761 14.76424  T-bar  =  10.7079 
HHnumber  overall  2.840859  1.24596 1 10  N =  218133 
  between    1.114703 1 10  n =   20419 
 within    0.6896692 -2.559141 9.650382  T-bar  =  10.6828 
childnn  overall  0.574709  0.889277 0 6  N =  218133 
  between    0.7470115 0 5  n =   20419 
 within    0.5399156 -3.330053 5.699709  T-bar  =  10.6828 
Variable   Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max  Observations 
            
child_0_14  overall  0.442625  0.7926851 0 6  N =  218133 
  between    0.6379028 0 5  n =   20419 
 within    0.5024334 -3.033566 5.164847  T-bar  =  10.6828 
            
child_0_1  overall  0.036203  0.1901513 0 3  N =  218133 
  between    0.1151146 0 2  n =   20419 
 within    0.173233 -0.963797 2.911203  T-bar  =  10.6828 
            
child_2_4  overall  0.088684  0.3096961 0 4  N =  218133 
  between    0.1926608 0 2  n =   20419 
 within    0.2631211 -1.161316 3.588684  T-bar  =  10.6828 
            
child_5_7  overall  0.089757  0.3106881 0 4  N =  218133 
  between    0.186222 0 2  n =   20419 
 within    0.268049 -1.310243 3.589757  T-bar  =  10.6828 
            
child_15_18  overall  0.186611  0.4542994 0 4  N =  218133 
  between    0.3809656 0 3.333333  n =   20419 
 within    0.3729273 -2.063389 3.586611  T-bar  =  10.6828 
            
child_16_18  overall  0.13224  0.3726613 0 4  N =  218133 
  between    0.2759073 0 2.666667  n =   20419 
 within    0.3209628 -1.86776 3.598907  T-bar  =  10.6828 
            
child_indp  overall  0.418547  0.7339816 0 6  N =  218133 
  between    0.641763 0 5  n =   20419 
 within    0.5004862 -4.181453 5.085214  T-bar  =  10.6828 
            
RHHInc  overall  308.9187  184.4344 0 4225.467  N =  209820 
  between    155.174 0 2289.392  n =   19875 
  within    111.2724 -1948.852 3795.859  T-bar =  10.557 
            
Unemp  overall  0.087663  0.2828054 0 1  N =  202057 
  between    0.2102597 0 1  n =   18741 
 within    0.2205301 -0.849837 1.045997  T-bar  =  10.7815 
            
lossjob  overall  0.032485  0.1772842 0 1  N =  180577 
  between    0.0996188 0 1  n =   16786 
 within    0.1652493 -0.634182 0.989007  T-bar  =  10.7576 
            
Emp  overall  0.606174  0.4885982 0 1  N =  208902 
  between    0.4109576 0 1  n =   19477 
 within    0.3077888 -0.352159 1.564508  T-bar  =  10.7256 
              40
Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description.(follows) 
Retired  overall  0.228044  0.4195723 0 1  N =  202053 
  between    0.3732792 0 1  n =   18741 
 within    0.2141244 -0.730289 1.186377  T-bar  =  10.7813 
            
Married  overall  0.611161  0.4874877 0 1  N =  210298 
  between    0.4584234 0 1  n =   19280 
 within    0.2350405 -0.347172 1.569495  T-bar  =  10.9076 
            
getMar  overall  0.016398  0.127002 0 1  N =  188068 
  between    0.0690464 0 1  n =   17401 
 within    0.1204354 -0.483602 0.97292  T-bar  =  10.8079 
            
Separated overall  0.013771  0.1165391 0 1  N =  210298 
  between    0.0773868 0 1  n =   19280 
 within    0.0993114 -0.902896 0.972104  T-bar  =  10.9076 
            
getSep  overall  0.005897  0.0765641 0 1  N =  188068 
  between    0.0320351 0 1  n =   17401 
 within    0.0728432 -0.494103 0.962419  T-bar  =  10.8079 
            
Divorced  overall  0.064841  0.2462462 0 1  N =  210298 
  between    0.2103901 0 1  n =   19280 
 within    0.1324858 -0.893492 1.023175  T-bar  =  10.9076 
            
getDiv  overall  0.006083  0.0777556 0 1  N =  188068 
  between    0.0385265 0 1  n =   17401 
 within    0.0737633 -0.493917 0.962605  T-bar  =  10.8079 
            
Widowed  overall  0.072825  0.25985 0 1  N =  210298 
  between    0.2523443 0 1  n =   19280 
 within    0.1123156 -0.885508 1.031159  T-bar  =  10.9076 
            
nEdyear  overall  11.58132  2.414317 7 18  N =  204692 
  between    2.256172 7 18  n =   18768 
 within    0.8051404 2.146542 20.15275  T-bar  =  10.9064 
            
House owner  overall  0.49142  0.4999275 0 1  N =  218064 
  between    0.4495444 0 1  n =   20410 
 within    0.2503686 -0.466913 1.449753  T-bar  =  10.6842 
            
Hosp  overall  0.120138  0.3251238 0 1  N =  184829 
  between    0.1877441 0 1  n =   18673 
  within    0.2928582 -0.813195 1.074684  T-bar =  9.8982 
            
Age17_19  overall  0.049334  0.2165651 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.2562399 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1611139 -0.700666 1.007667  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age20_22  overall  0.04944  0.2167853 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1659488 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1848919 -0.70056 1.007773  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age23_25  overall  0.052902  0.2238383 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1601443 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1967599 -0.697098 1.011235  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age26_28  overall  0.057492  0.2327808 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1460841 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2089711 -0.692508 1.015825  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age29_31  overall  0.061884  0.2409452 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1478608 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2181042 -0.688116 1.020217  T-bar  =  10.8503 
              41
Table A1. Summary statistics and variable description.(follows) 
Age32_34  overall  0.062754  0.2425207 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1330483 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2222003 -0.687246 1.021087  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age35_37  overall  0.062722  0.2424625 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1259791 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2233945 -0.687278 1.021055  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age38_40  overall  0.05996  0.2374125 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1167984 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2195829 -0.69004 1.018293  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age41_43  overall  0.057027  0.2318947 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1184805 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2143614 -0.692973 1.01536  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age44_46  overall  0.054173  0.2263586 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1163896 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2092889 -0.695827 1.012506  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age47_49  overall  0.05159  0.2211981 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1148381 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.2041702 -0.69841 1.009923  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age50_52  overall  0.048169  0.2141244 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1037509 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1979362 -0.701831 1.006503  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age53_55  overall  0.045821  0.209098 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1040305 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1930696 -0.704179 1.004155  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age56_58  overall  0.044537  0.2062852 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1032742 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1903232 -0.705463 1.00287  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age59_61  overall  0.0423  0.201272 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.1025706 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1852206 -0.707701 1.000633  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age62_64  overall  0.040371  0.1968271 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.0994792 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1808811 -0.70963 0.998704  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age65_67  overall  0.036029  0.1863631 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.0907262 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1709328 -0.713971 0.994363  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age68_70  overall  0.030555  0.1721098 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.0888155 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1572404 -0.719445 0.988889  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age71_73  overall  0.02579  0.1585097 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.092915 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.142603 -0.72421 0.984124  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age74_76  overall  0.021398  0.1447085 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.0906041 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1291776 -0.728602 0.979732  T-bar  =  10.8503 
            
Age77_79  overall  0.016896  0.1288816 0 1  N =  217213 
  between    0.0897941 0 1  n =   20019 
 within    0.1136051 -0.733104 0.975229  T-bar  =  10.8503 
              42
Tab A2. Life Satisfaction Ordered Probit Regression for different equivalent income and 
number of children, all samples. 
  Base   Per Capita Official GES Modified OECD  Squared  Schwarze 
Equivalent Income  0.245***  0.237***  0.238***  0.247***  0.245***  0.243*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
childHH -0.024***  0.050***  0.031***  0.018**  0.014*  0.028*** 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
nonchildHH -0.099***  -0.007  -0.006  -0.033***  -0.053***  -0.036*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age17_19 0.159***  0.198***  0.213***  0.175***  0.178***  0.186*** 
 (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
Age20_22 0.081  0.116**  0.107**  0.095*  0.099**  0.106** 
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Age23_25 0.051  0.082*  0.070  0.061 0.067  0.073 
 (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Age26_28 -0.009  0.020  0.006  -0.001 0.006  0.011 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Age29_31 -0.049  -0.020  -0.035  -0.042 -0.034  -0.029 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Age32_34 -0.122***  -0.092**  -0.107**  -0.115**  -0.107**  -0.102** 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Age35_37 -0.171***  -0.142***  -0.151***  -0.163***  -0.156***  -0.151*** 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Age38_40 -0.224***  -0.199***  -0.200***  -0.215***  -0.212***  -0.207*** 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Age41_43 -0.280***  -0.258***  -0.254***  -0.269***  -0.269***  -0.265*** 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Age44_46 -0.305***  -0.287***  -0.282***  -0.295***  -0.296***  -0.293*** 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Age47_49 -0.312***  -0.297***  -0.294***  -0.304***  -0.305***  -0.302*** 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Age50_52 -0.306***  -0.292***  -0.292***  -0.299***  -0.299***  -0.297*** 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Age53_55 -0.311***  -0.298***  -0.299***  -0.305***  -0.305***  -0.302*** 
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Age56_58 -0.215***  -0.203***  -0.205***  -0.210***  -0.209***  -0.207*** 
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
Age59_61 -0.102**  -0.091**  -0.092**  -0.097**  -0.096**  -0.094** 
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Age62_64 0.005  0.013  0.012  0.008 0.009  0.011 
 (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Age65_67 0.086**  0.093**  0.092**  0.089**  0.090**  0.091** 
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)   43
Tab A2. Life Satisfaction Ordered Probit Regression for different equivalent income and 
number of children, all samples (follows). 
 
Age68_70 0.084**  0.089**  0.089**  0.086**  0.086**  0.087** 
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Age71_73 0.100**  0.104***  0.104***  0.102***  0.102***  0.103*** 
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Age74_76 0.089**  0.093**  0.093**  0.091**  0.091**  0.092** 
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038) 
Age77_79 0.040  0.041  0.041  0.040 0.040  0.041 
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Unemp -0.355***  -0.357***  -0.357***  -0.355***  -0.355***  -0.356*** 
 (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
lossjob 0.027  0.029  0.028  0.027  0.028  0.028 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Emp 0.036***  0.037***  0.038***  0.036***  0.035***  0.036*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Retired -0.167***  -0.164***  -0.164***  -0.165***  -0.165***  -0.165*** 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Married 0.104***  0.142***  0.132***  0.118***  0.123***  0.130*** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
getMar 0.197***  0.190***  0.192***  0.195***  0.193***  0.192*** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Separated -0.138***  -0.129***  -0.132***  -0.137***  -0.133***  -0.131*** 
 (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
getSep -0.184***  -0.186***  -0.187***  -0.185***  -0.185***  -0.185*** 
 (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Divorced -0.073**  -0.067**  -0.071**  -0.073**  -0.070**  -0.068** 
 (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
getDiv -0.032  -0.026  -0.027  -0.030  -0.029  -0.028 
 (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Widowed 0.055  0.047  0.046  0.049 0.051  0.050 
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
nEdyear 0.014***  0.014***  0.014***  0.014***  0.014***  0.014*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
House owner  0.134***  0.137***  0.136***  0.135***  0.135***  0.136*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Hosp -0.250***  -0.250***  -0.251***  -0.250***  -0.250***  -0.250*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 160046  160046  160046  160046  160046  160046 
Notes:Robust Standard Errors clustered by individual. Cut off points available upon request.  
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Tab.A3. Life Satisfaction Ordered Probit Regression for different equivalent income and 
number of children: splits West and East samples. 
  Base  Per Capita  Official GES  Modified OECD  Squared  Schw  Base  Per Capita  Official GES  Modified OECD  Squared  Schw 
 West  West  West  West  West West  East  East  East East  East  East 
Equivalent  Income  0.215***  0.208***  0.208*** 0.216***  0.215*** 0.212***  0.355***  0.359***  0.359*** 0.372***  0.365***  0.365*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027) (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
childHH -0.035***  0.028***  0.012  0.001  -0.003  0.013  -0.004  0.112***  0.083***  0.062***  0.055***  0.068*** 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
nonchildHH -0.092***  -0.012  -0.011 -0.035*** -0.052***  -0.032*** 
-
0.128*** 0.008  0.009  -0.034**  -0.062*** -0.046*** 
 (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Age17_19 0.190***  0.228***  0.241***  0.206***  0.209***  0.219***  0.190  0.232**  0.260**  0.209*  0.212*  0.217* 
 (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.059) (0.059)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.116) (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.116) 
Age20_22 0.098*  0.132**  0.123**  0.111** 0.115**  0.124**  0.121  0.160  0.151  0.139  0.142  0.147 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) (0.057)  (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.111) (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.111) 
Age23_25  0.063  0.093*  0.081 0.073  0.078 0.085  0.086  0.123  0.108 0.100  0.106  0.111 
 (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054) (0.054)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.109) (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.109) 
Age26_28  -0.010  0.017  0.005 -0.002  0.004 0.011  0.043  0.081  0.061 0.054  0.064  0.068 
 (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053) (0.053)  (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.107) (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.107) 
Age29_31 -0.038  -0.011  -0.024  -0.031  -0.024  -0.017 -0.035  0.005  -0.017  -0.026  -0.014  -0.009 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.106) (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.106) 
Age32_34 -0.096*  -0.068  -0.081  -0.089* -0.082  -0.075 -0.156  -0.118 -0.137  -0.150  -0.137  -0.132 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.106) (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.106) 
Age35_37 -0.133**  -0.106**  -0.115**  -0.126**  -0.120**  -0.113** -0.239**  -0.205*  -0.210**  -0.228**  -0.222**  -0.218** 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.106) (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.106) 
Age38_40 -0.174***  -0.149***  -0.152***  -0.165***  -0.162***  -0.155*** 
-
0.332*** -0.303***  -0.294***  -0.316***  -0.316*** -0.313*** 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105) (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105) 
Age41_43 -0.230***  -0.207***  -0.206***  -0.220***  -0.219***  -0.213*** 
-
0.384*** -0.362***  -0.348***  -0.366***  -0.372*** -0.369*** 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104) (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
Age44_46 -0.256***  -0.238***  -0.234***  -0.246***  -0.247***  -0.243*** 
-
0.409*** -0.390***  -0.381***  -0.394***  -0.399*** -0.396*** 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.103) (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Age47_49 -0.247***  -0.232***  -0.229***  -0.239***  -0.240***  -0.236*** 
-
0.474*** -0.457***  -0.453***  -0.462***  -0.465*** -0.462*** 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.103) (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
Age50_52 -0.246***  -0.232***  -0.232***  -0.239***  -0.239***  -0.236*** 
-
0.457*** -0.441***  -0.442***  -0.448***  -0.448*** -0.446*** 
 (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051) (0.051)  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.103) (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Age53_55 -0.268***  -0.256***  -0.256***  -0.262***  -0.262***  -0.259*** 
-
0.416*** -0.401***  -0.403***  -0.408***  -0.408*** -0.406*** 
 (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051) (0.051)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.102) (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.102) 
Age56_58 -0.156***  -0.144***  -0.145***  -0.151***  -0.150***  -0.147*** 
-
0.374*** -0.358***  -0.361***  -0.366***  -0.366*** -0.364*** 
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050) (0.050)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.100) (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.100) 
Age59_61 -0.057  -0.047  -0.048  -0.053  -0.052  -0.049 -0.223**  -0.209**  -0.211**  -0.216**  -0.216**  -0.214** 
 (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048) (0.048)  (0.098)  (0.098)  (0.098) (0.098)  (0.098)  (0.098)   45
Tab.A3. Life Satisfaction Ordered Probit Regression for different equivalent income and 
number of children: splits West and East samples (follows)  
Age62_64  0.017 0.025 0.024  0.020 0.021 0.023 -0.038  -0.025  -0.027  -0.031  -0.031  -0.029 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
Age65_67  0.090** 0.096** 0.095**  0.092** 0.092** 0.094** 0.059  0.069  0.068  0.064  0.065  0.066 
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043) (0.043) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Age68_70  0.091** 0.096** 0.096**  0.093** 0.093** 0.095** 0.039  0.049  0.048  0.044  0.044  0.045 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) (0.042) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
Age71_73  0.096** 0.100** 0.100**  0.098** 0.098** 0.099** 0.090  0.098  0.097  0.094  0.094  0.095 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) (0.042) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Age74_76  0.096** 0.099** 0.099**  0.098** 0.098** 0.098** 0.042  0.048  0.048  0.045  0.046  0.046 
 (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Age77_79  0.038 0.039 0.040  0.039 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.042 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) 
Unemp  -0.376*** -0.378*** -0.378***  -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.377*** -0.306*** -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.303*** -0.304*** -0.303*** 
 (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
lossjob  0.050* 0.053* 0.053*  0.052* 0.052* 0.053* -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 -0.026  -0.025 -0.025 
 (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Emp  0.022 0.023 0.024  0.022 0.022 0.022 0.130***  0.131***  0.131***  0.128***  0.129***  0.129*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Retired  -0.160*** -0.157*** -0.157***  -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.158***  -0.078* -0.076* -0.076* -0.076* -0.076* -0.076* 
 (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Married  0.144*** 0.181*** 0.171***  0.158*** 0.163*** 0.172*** 0.019  0.060  0.049  0.032  0.038  0.043 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
getMar  0.185*** 0.178*** 0.181***  0.183*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.214*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Separated -0.144***  -0.134**  -0.139**  -0.143***  -0.139** -0.137** -0.106  -0.100 -0.102 -0.108 -0.103 -0.102 
 (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054) (0.054) (0.081) (0.083) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) 
getSep  -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.167***  -0.166*** -0.165*** -0.166***  -0.218** -0.221** -0.223** -0.220** -0.219** -0.219** 
 (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058) (0.058) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Divorced  -0.086** -0.080** -0.084**  -0.086** -0.083** -0.081**  -0.024 -0.020 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
getDiv  -0.033 -0.026 -0.027  -0.030 -0.029 -0.028 -0.014 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) (0.042) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Widowed  0.057 0.052 0.050  0.053 0.055 0.054 0.081 0.057 0.059 0.065 0.068 0.065 
 (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
nEdyear  0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***  0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
House  owner  0.132*** 0.135*** 0.134***  0.133*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Hosp  -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.244***  -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.268*** -0.267*** -0.269*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.267*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Time  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116720 116720 116720  116720 116720 116720 43326  43326  43326  43326  43326  43326 
Notes:Robust Standard Errors clustered by individual. Cut off points available upon request.    46
Table A4. Variable legend 
   
childHH  Number of children (aged between 0 and 18) living in the household 
nonchildHH  Number of adults living in the household beyond the respondent 
Offspring  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent has children 
Unemployed  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is unemployed 
Loss of job  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent has lost the job in 
the current year 
Employed  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is employed 
Retired  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is retired 
Married  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is married 
Marriage  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent got married in the 
current year  
Separated  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is separated  
Separation  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent got separated in 
the current year 
Divorced  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is divorced 
Divorce  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent got divorced in the 
current year 
Widowed  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is widowed 
Education years  Number of years of education 
House Owner  Dummy variable taking value of one if the respondent is house owner 
Hosp  Number of hospital visits in the current year  
   
 